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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WEENIG BROTHERS, INC., a Cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. No. 7992 
M. NEPHI MANNING. 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was filed by the plaintiff, W eenig Brothers, ~ 
Inc., hereinafter referred to as the nCorporation," against 
the defendant, M. Nephi Manning, for the recovery of dam-
ages arising from a collision occuring between the Corpora-
tion's truck and Manning's automobile. 
On the early morning of November 27, 1950, Ronald Z. 
W eenig, an employee of the Corporation, reported for work 
and at about 7:00 o'clock A.M., left the Corporation's place 
of business in 0 gden, Utah, on a doughnut delivery route· 
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(Tr. 3). He made a few deliveries around Ogden, (Tr. 3) and 
then proceeded North on Wall Avenue (Tr. 4). He was driv-
ing the Corporation's 1948 Chevrolet station wagon (Tr. 4). 
Wall Avenue is a two-larie roadway, one lane for northbound 
ttaffic and one lane provided .for southbound traffic. It is an 
improved hard-surfaced roadway and runs generally in a 
north-south direction (Tr. 4 and 5), the same being 21 feet 
in width and with shoulders of about 7 feet ad joining the 
concrete (Tr. 5 and 43). There is a barrow pit paralleling the 
east.erly side of the highway, about 2 feet in depth (Tr. 5 and 
45-Defendant' s Exhibit 1). 
On this morning, there was an intermittent fog spread over 
portions. of 0 gden and as W eenig drove north on Wall Street, 
he observed this atmospheric condition (Tr. 4, 14, 15 and 44). 
The roadway was ~ry (Tr. 11, 74 and so-Defendant's Ex-
hibit 1) , and W eenig was familiar with the road, having 
driven it many times for the year and one-half previous (Tr. 
4, 12 and 13) . As he reached the 2nd Street intersection, the 
. fog became quite thick and W eenig turned the lights on in 
plaintiff Corporation's truck. The speed limit for this area on 
Wall Avenue is 40 miles .per hour (Tr. 6). Weenig continu· 
ed north after passing 2nd Street, driving in his lane for 
northbound traffic. At this point the fog became more dense 
and visibility was reduced ( T r. 6, 14) . A short time there· 
after, Weenig suddenly saw two parallel sets of lights ahead 
of him, one set indicating a vehicle was approaching on his 
side of the highway (Tr. 16, 21, 22). The vehicle on Weenig's 
side of the highway was owned and being driven by M. Nephi 
Manning, defendant and appellee herein. 
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According to the testimony of Weenig and the investi-
gating officer, Weenig was traveling at approximately 30 
miles per hour when he suddenly saw Manning's _vehicle 
coming directly toward him from out . of the fog (Tr .. 6, 
16, 42). There is a conflict in the evidence regarding Weenig's 
speed at that time as Manning claims it was at a Hfrightening 
speed," (Tr. 7?,) while witness Carter, an expert called by 
the defense, testified it could have been 42 miles per hour 
or greater (Tr. 121). At the instant Weenig observed Man-
ning's vehicle approaching, it was on his side of the highway, 
parallel with another automobile also proceeding so~th, and 
only about fifty feet away (Tr. 6, 21, 22). Defendant Man-
ning estimated the distance between his automobile and the 
Weenig truck to have been between seventy-five and one hun ... 
dred feet (Tr. 70 and 71), that he had turned out to pass this 
other southbound vehicle, and that he was traveling about 
25 to 30 miles per hour .(Tr. 42, 84). Apparently both Weenig 
and Manning attempted to avoid the impending c<;>llision by 
turning their respective vehicles to the right (Tr. 6 and 70). 
However, the vehicles were together before the drivers had 
time to do any more than merely sense the danger and · react, 
. . . and the .left front of the Manning coupe collided with the left 
side of the W eenig truck as it veered to. the northeast ( T r. 
6 and 71-Defendant' s Exhibit 1) . The left front wheel of 
Manning's automobile was 3 feet. to the east of the center 
of the roadway at th_e time of the impact, by his own testi-. 
mony (Tr. 75), and he further testified that his vehicle was 
completely over on Weenig's one-half of the highway when 
he first observed its headlights ·some seventy-five to one hun-
dred feet ahead (Tr. 81 and 82). . 
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After the impact, the Weenig truck left the easterly edge 
of the roadway and rolled over in the barrow pit, coming to a 
stop with its wheels in the air and resting on its top (Tr. 
Defendant's Exhibit 1) . The place where it came to a stop was 
on the east side of the highway, some 115 feet northeast of 
the point of impact (Tr. 43 and 75). The Manning automobile 
skidded south some 40 feet from th~ point of the impact and 
stopped, facing south, still on the concrete portion of the 
highway (Tr. 72 and 73). 
As a result of this collision, the Weenig truck sustained 
extensive damage (Plaintiff's Exhibit A and Defendant's Ex-
hibit 1) , requiring the Corporation to dispose of the truck, 
receiving $300.00 for its salvage value (Tr. 2 and 65-Plain-
tiff' s Exhibit B) . The reasonable value of the truck at the 
time of the accident was $1370.00, making a net loss to 
the Corporation of $1070.00 (Tr. 2 and 65). The Corporation 
incurred further damage in the sum of $17.50, for wrecker 
and storage charges (Tr. 2-Plaintiff's Exhibit C). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the case 
under advisement (Tr. 126) and on November 10, 1952, ren-
dered judgment in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff 
corporation, no cause for action, on the grounds that plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence (R. 020). Plaintiff 
Corporation's counsel then filed and thereafter argued a motion 
to set aside the decision for defendant and to enter judgment 
for the plaintiff Corporation, or in the alternative for a new 
trial (R. 015), which motion was ultimately denied by the 
trial court (R. 016). The court thereafter signed and filed its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in accordance therewith on February 26, 1953 (R. 009 through 
012). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The plaintiff Corporation filed this appeal, and has desig-
nated and included the entire record and all of th~ proceedings 
and evidence in the action, and in its appeal relies upon the 
following points: 
I. The trial court erred in making and entering Finding of 
Fact No. 5 to the effect that the plaintiff corporation's truck 
automobile was of the reasonable value of $1,020.00 .at the 
time of the accident for the reason that it was stipulated by 
counsel for the defendant at trial that said truck's reasonable 
value was $1,3 70.00 and that the salvage value thereof was 
$300.00, making a~ net loss to the plaintiff of $1,070.00 ·for the 
truck as a result of the accident with defendant. 
II. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff corpora-
tion's employee was driving its truck at a speed of. between 46 
and 53 miles per hour at the. time -of the accident with de-
fendant on the ground and for the reason that said finding 
is wholly unsupported by the evidence. 
III. The trial court erred in finding that" the damages sus-
tained to plaintiff corporation's truck were not the result of 
any carelessness or negligence on the part of the defendant 
for the reason that such a finding is unsupported by the evi-
dence and contrary to law. 
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IV. The trial court erred in finding . that the speed of 
plai~tiff co~poration' s truck was negligence on the part of its 
driver which contributed to the damages sustained by plaintiff 
on the grol.}.nd and for the reason that such a finding is unsup-
ported by the evidence and contrary to· law. 
V. That there is no evidence to support the Conclusions 
of Law, and the Judgment of no caues of action is contrary to 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND EN-
TERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 TO THE EFFECT 
THAT· THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S TRUCK 
AUTOMOBILE WAS OF THE REASONABLE VALUE OF 
$1,020.00 AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT FOR THE 
REASON THAT IT WAS STIPULATED BY COUNSEL 
FOR THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL THAT SAID TRUCK'S 
REASONABLE VALUE WAS $1,370.00 AND THAT THE 
SALVAGE VALUE THEREOF. WAS $300.00 MAKING A 
NET LOSS TO THE PLAINTIFF OF $1,070.00 AS A RE-
SULT OF THE ACCIDENT WITH DEFENDANT. 
At the trial of this case, counsel for defendant, M. Nephi 
Manning, stipulated in the record that the reasonable value 
of the plaintiff corporation's truck at the time of the collision 
with the defendant was $1,370.00, and that the sum of $300.00 
was received by the plaintiff as salvage, making a total or net 
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loss of $1,070.00 (Tr. 2 and 65). This was an unequivocal 
stipulation on the part of defendant's counsel, with no evi-
dence contrary thereto in the record. We believe this error in 
figures was an oversight on the part of defendant's counsel 
in his preparation of the findings of fact and will be confessed 
in his responding brief. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF CORPORATION'S EMPLOYEE WAS DRIV-
ING ITS TRUCK AT A SPEED OF BETWEEN 46 AND 53! 
MILES PER HOUR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT 
WITH DEFENDANT ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE 
REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS.WHOLLY UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The only evidence before the court touching upon the 
speed of plaintiff's truck in excess of 30 miles per hour was 
that the defendant said it was coming at eta frightening speed," 
(Tr. 73) and that of expert witness Carter who stated that 
it could have been 42 miles per hour or greater (Tr. 121). 
It will be readily appreciated that the defendant's testimony 
would be of little value as he was not in a position to make 
any worthwhile observatio-n of the speed of a vehicle approach-
ing directly in front of him and when he himself was traveling 
approximately the same speed. His statement would be self-
serving at best because he had created the perilous situation 
and would be attempting to justify his position by placing 
the blame for the impending collision upon· the plaintiff's 
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driver and explain away his own culpability. We accordingly 
turn to expert witness Carter's testimony for a review of 
exactly what he said concerning the speed of plaintiff's truck 
based upon the distance it traveled after the impact coupled 
with the fact that it turned over. His testimony is covered in 
the record beginning with page 107. We might say here that 
we do not wish to belabor the court with a review of this evi-
dence as we fail to see wherein the speed of plaintiff's truck 
in any way contributed to this accident, but we do wish to 
clarify the· situation so that this court will not be misled into 
believing that the truck was traveling anywhere near as fast 
as is indicated in the trial court's findings. Much of this wit-
ness's testimony g0es to laying a foundation for his qualifica-
tions and then at page 117 of the record, the witness concludes 
that rrapparently from what I deduct it rolled one and a half." 
The witness then said in r~sponse to the trial court's question 
concerning the speed for one and a half rolls of the truck 
(Tr. 117):. 
Q. {(Now, one and a half rolls? 
A. One and a half rolls would be thirty and six-tentbs 
miles per hour . . . JJ 
Witness Carter did not know at what place, after the point of 
impact, that the truck began to roll as he stated that he didn't 
know where it started to roll (Tr. 118). On this same page of 
the transcript, defendant's counsel asked concerning the speed 
after a forty-foot skid but there was no evidence in the record 
to show that plaintiff's truck skidded forty feet prior to its 
rolling over. In fact all of the evidence is to the effect that 
after the impact with defendant's vehicle, the truck veered to 
10 
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the northeast and left the highway some forty feet north of the 
point of impact (Tr. 102) and it likely traveled· some dis-
tance on the shoulder of the highway before it even began 
rolling. The defendant and his witness Ross H. Johnson took 
measurements by tape from the point of impact on the highway 
to the place where the truck came to rest on its · top, and they 
both testified the distance was 113 feet (Tr. 43, 55, 75 and 
103). The investigating· officer arrived· at the scene of the col-
lision immediate! y after the accident occurred and in testifying 
about the visible markings on the roadway made by the plain-
tiff's truck, said (Tr. 61): 
By Mr. Bayle: ((You said you saw forty feet here, the 
marks of the tires of Weenig' s car or vehicle, what 
kind of marks were they ? 
A. From the point of the accident? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't recall saying I saw it. 
Q. · Did you see any from the point of the accident to 
the shoulder of the highway? 
A. The shoulder of the highway is ~here I noticed the 
first impression of a tire that would attach to . the 
W eenig car." 
This witness also testified that the W eenig vehicle made tire 
marks on the highway after the point of impact but denied 
they were skid marks as defense counsel's questions attempted 
to have shown (Tr. 55-56). These tire marks apparently merely 
indicated the direction of travel of the pfaintiff' s truck to the 
easte~ly edge of the highway. The only conclusion to be drawn 
is that Witness Carter was apparently using the 40 feet of skid 
l l 
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marks layed down by defendant's automobile after the impact, 
rather than any skid marks by ·the plaintiff's truck, of which 
there were none. Thus the. calculations made by Witness Carter 
that plaintiff's truck could have been g?ing between 42 and 
54% miles per hour were all deduced from conjecture, and 
assumed that plaintiff's truck left 40 feet of skid marks and 
then immediately began to roll (Tr. 118 and 119-Blackboard 
Chart and Diagram at R. 018 and 019). Thus his conclusions are 
speculative and assumed upon a given set of facts whi~h were 
not in evidence at the time of his testimony. 
We respectfully urge that this court reject any conclusions 
drawn by Witness Carter concerning plaintiff truck's speed 
at the time of the collision as being unsupported by the evidence 
and conjectural in nature. 
POINTS III and IV 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED TO PLAINTIFF CORPORA-
TION'S TRUCK WERE NOT THE RESULT OF ANY 
CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF 
THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH A 
FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE SPEED OF PLAINTIFF CORPORA~fiON'S TRUCK 
12 
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WAS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF. ITS DRIVER 
WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE DAMAGES SUSTAIN-
ED BY PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE 
REASON THAT SUCH A FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff corporation that the 
trial court erred in making and entering findings of fact to 
the effect that the acts of the defendant in no measure caused 
the accident and resulting damages · to plaintiff's truck, and 
that the collision was the responsibility of plaintiff's driver. 
These findings are wholly contrary to the decision of the trial 
court rendered after taking the case under advisement, and 
as indicated . by the order of the court by minute entry" on 
November 10, 1952 (R. 020.) wherein the court found the 
issue in favor of the defendant, no cause for action, on the 
grounds that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
We do not know why the findings of fact eventually signed 
by the trial _court were not in accord with the previous decision 
as the written findings were silent as to defendant's negligence, 
and made no mention of a finding of contributory negligence on 
the part of plaintiff's driver. 
We believe the essential question to be disposed of on this 
appeal is whether or not from the facts at hand the defendant 
was negligent and if so, was the plaintiff's driver contributorily 
negligent. 
The evidence shows, without dispute or contradiction, 
that at the time of the collision occurring between defendant's 
automobile and the plaintiff corporation's truck, the defend-
13 
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ant was traveling on the wrong or improper side of the high-
way for his direction of travel. We need only consider the de-
fendant's own testimony in this respect to establish that he 
turned his automobile to the improper side of the highway in 
an attempt to pass another vehicle, and at the time he could 
only see between 75 and 100 feet ahead (Tr. 70 and 71). The 
court's attention is .respectfully invited to the testimony on 
cross examination of the defendant, wherein the question ·of 
defendant's position on the highway is clearly established 
(Tr. 81 ).: 
By Mr. Bayle: ccso you had been on Weenig's side 
of the highway and were swinging back to get out of 
the way, were you not? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. How long had you been over on that side of his 
highway?· 
A. Only a matter of a second. Just got out there and was 
dropping back. 
Q. You said you saw his headlights seventy-five to 
one hundred feet· away, didn't you? 
A. Well, I suppose, that is about right. 
Q. And what did you do as soon as you saw his head-
lights? 
A. I started to turn back. 
Q. Where was your car at that time? 
A. Oh, possibly another three or four feet farther 
east than it was at the point of impact. 
Q. So that your car was completely over on the east· 
erly side of the highway when you first saw the 
headlights of the Weenig truck, is that right? 
14 
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A. I wouldn't say (completely'. 
Q. Well, you said it was about three feet plus another 
four, that is seven feet? 
A. Well, the car is six feet wide, it could have been 
six feet. 
Q. So it could have been six feet over on his side of 
the road? 
A. That is right." 
The investigating officer and all other witnesses who testified 
concerning . the place of impact, determined that it occurred 
3 feet to the east of the center of the highway. This point 
marked the left wheel of the defendant's automobile, so in-
asmuch as the left fender of his vehicle extended beyond the 
wheel, his automobile was at least 4 feet into the plaintiff 
truck's lane of traffic when the collision occurred~ The law 
imposes a duty on motorists to drive on the right side of high-
ways. Title 41~6-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as 
follows: 
((Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall 
be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except · 
as follows: · . 
( 1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction under the rules 
governing such movement." 
Title 41-6-57 of the same Utah Code places a limitation upon 
drivers who undertake to pass vehicles on a two-lane roadway, 
providing as follows: 
nNo vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the 
center of the roadway in overtaking and passing an-
15 
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other vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless 
such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncon1ing 
traffic for a sufficient. distance ahead to permit such 
overtaking and passing to be completely made without 
interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle ap-
proaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle 
. overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must 
return to the right-hand side of the roadway before 
coming within 100 feet of any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction." 
It will ·be observed that the last sentence of this latter statute 
places an absolute duty upon the driver of the ·overtaking 
vehicle to return to his side of the highway before coming 
within 100 feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction. In the instant ~ase, defendant Manning didn't give 
the driver of the corporation's truck anywhere near 100 feet as 
the defendant testified at the trial that he could only see from 
. 75 to 100 feet when he attempted to pass the vehicle pro-
ceeding ahead of him (Tr. 70, 71 and 81). As was said in 
the case of Maragakis vs. United States, 172 F. 2d 393: 
(tThe rule whether . statutory or decisional, which 
requires driver of vehicle overtaking another proceed-
ing in same direction to pass to the left at a safe dis-
tance, imposes a high degree of care commensurate with 
the circumstances involved. The driver attempts to 
pass at his peril, and the situation facing him must be 
such as to reasonably assure an ordinary prudent drivet 
that the passing can be accomplished U'ith safety to 
all occupants of the road." 
We believe this principle applies with even greater degree to 
the oncoming motorist who is traveling on his own side of 
the highway and is suddenly faced with the peril of meetinR 
16 
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a driver who has thrown caution to the winds and is bent upon 
passing regardless of the situation. As this court has said in 
the case of Staton vs. Western Macaroni Manufacturing Com-
pany, 52 Utah 426, 174 P. 821: 
(<The strongest kind of presumption of negligence 
prevails against party driving on wrong side of road.'' 
In the light of the facts of our instant case wherein defendant 
Manning clearly admits that he turned onto the improper 
side of the highway when he· could only see ahead between 
75 and 100 feet, and in view of the foregoing principles, one 
can come to no other conclusion than to say that the trial 
court erred in its finding in failing to ad judge the defendant 
guilty of the grossest kind of negligence. Turrietta vs. Wyche, 
New Mexico, 54 N. M. 5, 212 P. 2d 1041. 
We pass now to the question of whether or not plaintiff 
corporation's driver, W eenig, was guilty of negligent conduct 
which in any way contributed to the cause of the accident. At 
the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant's counsel made a 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint on the ground that 
plaintiff had shown no right to relief because of Title 57-7-113, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which is presently designated 
in the 1953 Code revision as Title 41-6-46 (Tr. 66 and 77). 
The court overruled defendant's motion, and rightly so. The 
aforementioned statute requires that a motorist shall not drive 
a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then ·existing; that in every event 
the speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid 
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colliding with any person, vehicle or other conveyance on or 
entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements 
and the duty of all persons to use due care. This statute is 
applicable only to objects, persons or vehicles lawfully on 
the highway, either stationary or proceeding in the same direc-
tion as the motorist charged with such duty. It has no applica-
tion to the situation of drivers approaching one another from 
opposite directions. As· was said in the case of Snook vs. Long 
(Iowa-1950) 241 Iowa 665, 42 NW 2d 76, 21 ALR 2d 1, 
at page 5: 
ctln the instant case, appellee was in his rightful 
. place on the highway. He was entitled to assume that 
anyone approaching him from the opposite direction 
would observe the law which prohibits one from pass-
ing another car on the left unless it can be done without 
interference with cars approaching from the opposite 
direction. Appellant's driver clearly violated this law 
and created a situation which would not reasonably be 
anticipated by Appellee. As we said in Coon vs. Rieke, 
232 Iowa 859, 6. N. W. 2d 309, this statute is a speed 
sta.tute and where a driver of a motor vehicle, in his 
proper place on the highway, meets an oncoming car 
which does not give way to the right, there is no clear 
distance ahead in which to determine the proper speed 
at which he should drive." 
We believe that the duty of drivers approaching from opposite 
directions is not to stop but to comply with the law and yield 
one-half of the traveled way. To permit defendant Manning 
herein to escape liability for his culpable negligence by com· 
plaining of the speed of defendant corporation's truck which 
was proceeding on its own right and proper side of the high· 
'vay would be manifestly unjust. It would establish a rule of 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
law which would invite slaughter and mayhem upon our high-
ways and give the driver proceeding upon the wrong side of 
the roadway an opportunity to avoid responsibility for his 
negligence in· sudden! y turning into the path of an oncoming 
vehicle. We do not believe the law or this court would ap-
prove of a tendency to develop such a principle. The law re-
quires that drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite direc-
tions shall pass each other to the right and that where there 
is width for not more than one line of traffic in each direction, 
each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of the 
main traveled portion of the roadway, Title 41-6-54, Utah Code 
Annotated, 195~. It is recognized that one may drive upon 
any part of the highway when it does not violate the law or 
interfere with its use by others. But as this court said in the 
case of Richards vs. Palace Laundry Company, 55 Utah 409, 
186 Pac. 439: 
ttWhile in case the street or highway is not used by 
others one may drive on. any part thereof, yet, when a 
motorist or bicyclist passes from right to left of the 
center of the street, he loses some of his rights, and 
may not be heard to complain ·of the conduct of those 
who are on the proper side of the street to the same 
extent as though he also were on the proper side." 
In the instant case, ·defendant Manning was on the wrong side 
of the highway; however, he contends that while that may 
have been so, the defendant's driver was traveling too fast for 
the foggy conditions then prevailing. Speed only becomes im-
portant when it is a contributing factor to the proximate cause 
of the accident. Defendant Manning create~ a sudden and 
perilous emergency by turning his vehicle to the improper side 
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of the highway in violation of law and when he could see less 
than 100 feet ahead (Tr. 122)·. Assuming both vehicles \\'ere 
traveling approximately 30 miles. an hour, each would tra-
vel about 45 feet per· second (Tr. 124 and 125). The re-
action time of each driver would be % of one second (Tr . 
. 125). Giving defendant ·Manning the benefit of the doubt 
by saying he saw the plaintiff's truck when it was 90 feet dis-
. tant from him, and applying the reaction time of each driver, 
it would mean that the two vehicles would have collided before 
either driver could do more than merely recognize the danger, 
start to apply the brakes, and begin to turn to the right to 
avoid the accident. At the speed of each vehicle traveling 30 
miles per hour, and approaching each· other head on, the 
collisi.on would occur within one ( 1) second, as each vehicle 
woul~ tr~vel 45 feet, or one-half of the 90-foot distance, 
within that short period of time. If either vehicle were traveling 
faster than this speed of 30 miles per hour, the time would 
be proportionately lessened as the speed increased. 
How could it then be said that the speed of plaintiff's 
driver, Weenig, contributed to this accident or had any bear-
ing upon the collision. He was faced with a sudden and perilous 
situation and he reacted as any reasonably prud~nt person 
would have done under the circumstances. Experience has 
demonstrated that accidents are constantly occurring at curves 
on the highways, and on straight roads in bad weather, be· 
cause drivers persist in turning onto the improper side of the 
highway when their vision is obscured, in attempts to pass 
other vehicles. But for these acts of cupable negligence, acci· 
dents such as the one occurring in the instant case would never 
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happen. Speed on the part of plaintiffs driver had nothing to 
do with the proximate cause of this accident. As a matter of 
law, the defendanfs acts of negligence were the sole and 
proximate cause of the collision .. In the case of Bragdon vs. 
Kellog (Maine), 105 Atlantic 43 3, and annotated in 6 A.L.R. 
669, the court in passing upon this question of speed in situa-
tions of this nature said: 
nit is, then, a matter of common knowledge, the 
(usual experience' that automobiles are more often 
driven without reference to legal speed than in observ-
ance of it. It is the usual experience of operators that 
they are not authorized to rely on the legal presump-
tion that an approa~hing car is coming at a legal rate 
of speed, but must exercise due care in the operation 
of their own car, especially in approaching corners, 
curves and turns in the road, where their vision may be 
wholly or partially obscured." 
And as is said by the author in 5 American Jurisprudence, 
paragraph 272, page 654: 
"It has been asserted that a driver of a motor truck 
on a public highway who voluntarily turns his vehicle 
from the right-hand side of the road to the left; where 
vehicles going in the opposite direction are expected 
to travel, at a time when he cannot see the road for 
dust, without giving a reasonable warning signal, is 
~rossly negligent.'' 
and the same author at paragraph 286, page 661, of the same 
text book, says: 
HThe rights of one on his left-hand side of the road 
are inferior to the rights of another coming from the 
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opposite direction. A driver on his right~hand side of 
the road has a right to assume that another driver 
coming from the opposite directon will obey the law 
of the road, at least until such time as he sees or should 
see that he has no intention of so doing.'' 
Berry on Automobiles (5th Ed.), paragraph 252. 
Purdie vs. Brunswick et al (Wash.) 146 P. 2d 809. 
Carma C. O'Mally vs. Dan Eagan et. al (Wyo.) 2 P. 
2d 1063, 77 A.L.R. 582. 
In the recent decision of Ankeny vs. Talbot et al ( Colo-1952) 
250 P. 2d 1019, the plaintiff therein had some 450 feet to 
avoid the oncoming defendant who was angling over onto 
plaintiff's side of the ·highway. The Supreme Court of Colo-
rado in that case held that the trial court erred in denying 
plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict in his favor and against 
the defendant Talbot upon the issue of liability and that as 
between plaintiff and defendant, the only issue to be determined 
by the jury was the amount of damages to be awarded plaintiff. 
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, it 
is difficult to perceive how the trial court concluded that the 
plaintiff corporation was not entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. What could plaintiff's driver had done other than what 
he did do ? He was on his own proper side of the highway and 
the sole and proximate cause of the accident was defendant's 
culpable negligence in turning directly into his path. The trial 
court apparently concluded that plaintiff's speed was a con· 
tributing factor. We respectfully submit that the trial court 
erred in this respect and that as a matter of law, it cannot be 
said that plaintiff's driver was negligent under the particular 
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circumstances of this case. Before the defense of contributory 
negligence will prove availing, it must be shown that the. acts 
alleged as constituting such defense direct/ y contributed· to 
tbe injury. 5 American Jurisprudence, Para. 407, page 739. 
POINT V 
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDGMENT OF 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Considering what we believe to be the fifth point of error, 
we take the position that the trial court's judgment, of no 
cause of action, is unsupported by the evidence and contrary 
to law. A thorough and careful perusal of the evidence fails 
to justify a conclusion that the corporation's driver was guilty 
of conduct which in any way contributed to the accident. He 
acted as any other reasonably prudent person would have done 
under the circumstances. The sole proximate cause of this col-
lision and the resulting damages to plaintiff corporation's motor 
vehicle was the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep 
or maintain a proper lookout, and in driving to the left. and 
improper side of the highway when such movement could 
not be made in safety. 
CONCLUSION 
We respec.tfully submit that each of the points of error 
is well taken and· should be sustained, and that the judgment 
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of the trial court should be reversed with direction to enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation for the amount 
of damages as prayed in its complaint, and for costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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